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entee receives a normal and reasonable pecuniary reward through
his royalty provisions. He would be equally well protected by
royalty provisions where there is but one contract.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Company,14 de-
cided at the same time as the Line Material Company case, the
Court held invalid an industry-wide licensing agreement, con-
taining price fixing provisions, reversing a ruling by the district
court15 based on the precedent of United States v. General Elec-
tric. The Supreme Court held the General Electric case appli-
cable only in the absence of conspiratorial intent. Under this
reasoning Mr. Justice Reed's distinction between the Line Ma-
terial Company case and the General Electric case is unnecessary
if the distinction is grounded instead upon the existence of con-
spiratorial intent.
Whatever approach is adopted by the Court in the future its
ultimate holding in the Line Material Company case seems justi-
fiable on grounds of public policy and consistent with recent
decisions restricting the "exclusive right" of the patentee to
remain consonant with the best interests of the public. Free
competition is one of the basic assumptions of a workable capital-
istic economy. Competition, to be economically "free," neces-
sarily involves price competition. Fixed prices, even under the.
guise of patent monopoly, disturb open competition and create
abnormal and controlled market conditions.
VIRGINIA L. MARTIN
TORTS-AUTOMOBILES-POST-COLLISION ACcIDENTs-Defend-
ant's truck was parked on the highway at night without flares or
warning lights. The second defendant's automobile, traveling at
an excessive rate of speed, crashed into the rear of the truck
when defective brakes failed to hold. Plaintiff, a passerby, extri-
cated defendant car driver and his wife from the burning car
and returned for a floor mat to use as a pillow for the wife's head.
On the floor of the car plaintiff found a pistol, which he handed
to the defendant car driver. The car driver, temporarily deranged
by the shock of the accident, fired the pistol, striking plaintiff in
the leg. Held, on appeal from a judgment sustaining an exception
of no cause of action, the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury
was the concurring negligence of both defendants. Reversed and
remanded. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. (2d) 513 (La. App. 1948).
14. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 68 S.Ct. 525 (U.S. 1948).
15. 67 F. Supp. 397 (App. D.C. 1948).
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Although the risk of impact or collision is the most familiar
hazard 'arising from the careless operation of motor vehicles, the
occurrence of a collision may itself give rise to a dangerous con-
dition which in turn invites further mishaps of various kinds.
Of these "secondary" hazards, the risk of a second collision is
the one most frequently realized. Today's fast-moving traffic is
greatly imperilled by any obstacle on the highway. When two
cars collide, others may add to the pile-up1 or swerve into an-
other collision.2 Variations on this theme offer unlimited possi-
bilities. For example, in Rovinski v. Rowe,3 the defendant ran
into the rear of X's car, leaving it unable to move off the high-
way. Plaintiff, passing by in his wrecker, offered to move the car
off the road because of the danger in the fog. While plaintiff was
hooking up to X's car, the wrecker was struck by a third car,
pinning plaintiff between the wrecker and X's car. Plaintiff was
allowed recovery. 4
1. Giorlando v. Maitrejean, 22 So.(2d) 564 (La. App. 1945) (defendant negli-
gently struck parked truck and blocked the highway; car in which plaintiff
was a passenger negligently struck defendant's car; recovery); Hill v. Peres,
136 Cal. App. 132, 28 P.(2d) 946 (1934) (plaintiff thrown out of car by col-
lision with negligent defendant; third car struck defendant's car, crushing
plaintiff against curb; recovery against both defendants); Illinois Cent. R.R.
v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930) (smoke from defendant's engine
covered plaintiff's car, which was struck from behind by second car; plain-
tiff got out to inspect the damage; third car struck second car, pinning
plaintiff between cars; contributory negligence); Sherman v. Leicht, 238
App. Div. 271, 264 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1933) (plaintiff, a passenger, was standing
in a dazed condition in front of car following a collision when defendant's
car crashed into It from the rear, knocking down plaintiff); Thornton v.
Eneroth, 177 Wash. 1, 30 P.(2d) 951 (1934) (five collisions in quick succession
on icy road); Felix v. Soderburg, 207 Wis. 76, 240 N.W. 836 (1932) (defend-
ant's car negligently struck parked car of plaintiff; while plaintiff was in-
specting damage, third car negligently struck defendant's car, driving it
against plaintiff; recovery against both defendants).
2. Dollar v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 37 So.(2d) 549 (La. App.
1948) (defendant parked truck on highway; plaintiff stopped his car behind;
third car passing to the left caused fourth oncoming car to swerve and
crash into plaintiff; no recovery); Hunt v. Jones, 14 La. App. 520, 130 So.
138 (1930) (defendant's car swerved to avoid car ahead which stopped sud-
denly, struck oncoming plaintiff; no recovery); Holmberg v. Villaume, 158
Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924) (defendant applied brakes when he saw plain-
tiff's parked car, skidded, struck oncoming car in left lane, glanced and
struck plaintiff's car, blocking the road; fourth car, unable to pass, crashed
into plaintiff's car, injuring plaintiff; recovery); Kline v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357,
191 Atl. 43, 111 A.L.R. 406 (1937) (defendant failed to see parked truck in
time to stop, passed to left, colliding with oncoming plaintiff's car); Butts
v. Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6, 116 A.L.R. 1441 (1938) (Kroger truck
parked without flares, etc.; Ward failed to see in time to stop, passed to
left, striking Butts' car; Kroger liable to both). Liability of the owner of the
obstructing vehicle apparently turns on the question of whether the passing
vehicle "took a chance" or had no alternative to swerving.
3. 121 F.(2d) 687 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942).
4. Cf. McClure v. Richard, 225 Iowa 949, 282 N.W. 312 (1938) (defendant
struck parked truck in which plaintiff was riding; while plaintiff was re-
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Another post-accident hazard may be created by the dan-
gerous physical situation or condition of the vehicles following
the accident.5 In the Michigan case of Brugh v. Bigeloe,O the de-
fendant was pinned under his car following a collision. Plaintiff,
a passerby, lifted the car which then rolled over on 'top of him.
In a similar case decided in Wisconsin,7 plaintiff, a passenger, cut
his hand on broken glass while helping to right the overturned
car. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs in both cases.
The most novel of the secondary hazards is the situation il-
lustrated by the principal case. A serious accident often causes a
period of emotional upset for the persons involved, or sometimes
even onlookers. This may lead to irrational acts which result in
further injury to the actor or others. In Blanchard v. Reliable
Transfer Company," plaintiff was awakened early one morning
by an ambulance siren. In a few moments he heard it collide with
another vehicle. He dressed hurriedly and rushed to the scene of
the accident. In the excitement and confusion he overexerted
himself rendering assistance to injured persons, and later became
hysterical and suffered physically. 9 Here, too, the court gave
judgment for the plaintiff.
The facts of Brown v. Traveler's Indemnity Company,10 re-
cently decided in Wisconsin, are somewhat similar to those of
the principal case. The defendant driver knocked a cow into a
ditch. Plaintiff, a passenger, went to inform the owners of the
damage. In a few moments the plaintiff returned to the road.
The stunned cow, which had regained its feet, ran over the plain-
loading potatoes which had spilled from the rear of the truck, a third car
struck the truck, .injuring plaintiff; no recovery).
5. Churchman v. Sonoma County, 59 Cal.(2d) 801, 140 P.(2d) 81 (1943)
(road constructed by defendant gave way at the shoulder, dropping plain-
tiff's car into the ditch at a 45 degree angle; plaintiff fell and hit his head
on the pavement when he tried to climb out; recovery); Walborn v. Epley,
148 Pa. Super. 417, 24 A.(2d) 668 (1942) (two trucks collided, blocking an
underpass and spilling gasoline; unknown person waving flare to warn on-
coming trafilc ignited the gasoline, burning up a truck); Arnold v. Northern
States Power Co., 209 Minn. 551, 297 N.W. 182 (1941) (car ran off road crash-
ing Into a power pole; plaintiff's intestate electrocuted trying to aid driver;
recovery against driver and power company); Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb.
684, 234 N.W. 628, 81 A.L.R. 1000 (1931) (truck knocked trolley pole into the
street, but did not remove it; run into by car).
6. 310 Mich 74, 16 N.W.(2d) 668, 158 A.L.R. 184 (1944).
7. Hatch v. Smail, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W.(2d) 460, 166 A.L.R. 746 (1946).
8. 71 Ga. 843, 32 S.E.(2d) 420 (1944).
9. Israel v. Ulrich, 114 Conn. 599, 159 AtI. 634 (1932) (plaintiff bumped
about in a runaway truck due to ineffective brakes put out of commission
when defendant struck the parked truck; recovery for emotional upset);
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431, 76 A.L.R. 676 (1931) (a few
minutes after collision, plaintiff fainted, striking head on sidewalk; died
twenty minutes later; recovery).
10. 251 Wis. 188, 28 N.W.(2d) 306 (1947).
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tiff. Recovery was allowed. It is noteworthy that the court in the
principal case used an illustration of animal actions in discussing
proximate cause. The conduct of the irrational defendant was
compared with that of a dog which might have bitten the plain-
tiff from fright following the accident.1
In handling cases of injury arising from post-collision acci-
dents, the courts tend to place liability on the party responsible
for the initial collision. The conclusion reached is usually dis-
cussed in terms of "proximate cause." From the variety of defi-
nitions and theories which have arisen under the general doctrine
of proximate cause, the court has considerable latitude in choos-
ing a basis for its decision. The plaintiff will urge that the injury
was the "natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
negligence, '12 that such result was "foreseeable," 13 or that acts of
persons were the "normal response to the situation. 1 4 The de-
fendant, on the other hand, will attempt to show an "efficient
intervening cause,"' 5 a "superseding cause,"'" or that his negli-
gence was too "remote.' 7 But the rules of proximate cause are
of little assistance to the court in reaching a conclusion. The
problem is essentially one of policy. The court must decide
whether the rules requiring careful operation of motor vehicles
afford protection against the particular post-accident hazard in
the case under consideration. There can be no ready-made answer
to the issue of "proximate cause."' 8
The liberal tendency of courts to extend the consequences of
negligent driving beyond the initial occurrence of a collision is
perhaps justified by modern conditions. The wide variety of haz-
ards presented by today's fast, heavy traffic, the great danger of-
11. Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588, 41 Atl. 585, 45 L.R.A. 87, 67 Am. St.
Rep. 691 (1898) (defendant shot dog which ran wildly into house, knocking
down plaintiff; recovery).
12. Walborn v. Epley, 148 Pa. Super. 417, 24 A.(2d) 668 (1942).
13. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930); Corn-
stock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431, 76 A.L.R. 676 (1931).
14. Restatement of Torts, § 443, is often cited in this connection: "An
intervening act of a human being or animal which is a normal response to
the stimulus of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct, is not
a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's conduct is a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about." Hatch v. Smail, 249 Wis. 183, 23 N.W.(2d)
460,166 A.L.R. 746 (1946); Brown v. Traveler's Indemnity Co., 251 Wis. 188, 28
-N.W.(2d) 306 (1947); Walborn v. Epley, 148 Pa. Super. 417, 24 A.(2d) 668
(1942).
15. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930); Holmberg
v. Villaume, 158 Minn. 442, 197 N.W. 849 (1924).
16. Walborn v. Epley, 148 Pa. Super. 417, 24 A.(2d) 668 (1942); Butts v.
Ward, 227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6, 116 A.L.R. 1441 (1938).
17. McClure v. Richard, 225 Iowa 949, 282 N.W. 312 (1938).
18. See Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927).
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negligent driving, and the solvency of defendants through insur-
ance are some of the factors contributing to this trend.
Where the plaintiff is a rescuer, as in the principal case,
additional policy considerations favor his recovery. The rescuer
is regarded by society as a hero, and he is usually treated ac-
cordingly by the courts in awarding damages.1 "
JACK C. CALDWELL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-HAZARDOUS AND NON-HAZARDOUS
BUSINESSEs-LaFleur was employed in the defendant's nightclub
as a special police officer, commissioned a deputy sheriff, author-
ized to make arrests for infractions of the law, and was required
to wear a gun. He was shot and killed when he attempted to
apprehend a disorderly patron. Plaintiff, LaFleur's widow, con-
tended that the business was hazardous because the decedent's
duties required that he be in close proximity to a .dangerous
explosive. Held, plaintiff's demand for compensation rejected
on the basis that it is the occupation of the employer and not
the duties.of the employee which controls. LaFleur v. Johnson,
37 So.(2d) 869 (La. App. 1948).
According to the Workmen's Compensation Act,' the legis-
lature has designated certain businesses as hazardous. 2 Also,
it has enumerated certain hazardous features which have the
effect of injecting hazardous elements into businesses which
otherwise would be considered non-hazardous.3 Conceding that
a nightclub is not specifically designated as a hazardous business,
it may nevertheless become hazardous by the adoption of some
hazardous feature in its operation. In such cases, the only in-
quiry should be whether or not the work of the employee requires
19. "Sentiments of humanity applaud the act, the law commends it, and,
if not extremely rash and reckless, awards the rescuer redress for injuries
received .... Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 512, 137 N.W.
12, 14 (1912); Peyton v. Texas and Pac. Ry., 41 La. Ann. 861, 6 So. 690 (1889);
Whitworth v. Shreveport Belt Ry., 112 La. 363, 36 So. 414, 65 L.R.A. 129, 16
Am. Neg. Rep. 58 (1904). Cf. De Mahy v. Morgan La. & T. R.R. & S.S. Co.,
45 La. Ann. 1329, 14 So. 61 (1893); Henshaw v. Belyea, 220 Cal. 458, 31 P.(2d)
348 (1934). Rescue doctrine discussed in (1937) 16 Fordham L. Rev. 139,
(1946) 11 Mo. L. Rev. 317, annotation: Liability for death of, or injury to, one
seeking to rescue another in 19 A.L.R. 4. Combination of risk of second col-
lision and element of rescue: Petersen v. Lang Transp. Co., 32 Cal. App.(2d)
462, 90 P.(2d) 94 (1939) (defendant's car negligently collided with another
car; plaintiff, passerby, waved flashlight to warn oncoming traffic; struck
by car; recovery). Accord: Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549, 160 Atl. 738
(1932); Duff v. Bemidji Motor Service Co., 210 Minn. 456, 299 N.W. 196 (1941).
1. La. Act 20 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432].
2. Id. at § 1(1) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391].
3. Ibid.
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